Legislative Pork‐Barrel Funding and Public Policy Outcomes: The Role of Local‐Level Factors

Original

Legislative Pork‐Barrel Funding and Public Policy Outcomes: The Role of Local‐Level Factors

Luna Viana, Alketa Peci

Abstract

ABSTRACT The growing legislative influence over budget allocations through pork‐barrel funding raises concerns that this type of distributive policy may undermine effectiveness. We examine Brazil's mandatory pork‐barrel system to assess whether funding availability affects health outcomes and how local conditions shape these effects. We focus on municipalities' abilities to attract resources (“funding concentration”) and their autonomy over investment decisions (“funding flexibility”), with expectations conditioned by administrative capacity. Using panel data on 4114 Brazilian municipalities (2015–2021) and controlling for endogeneity and selection bias, we find that pork‐barrel funding is associated with higher short‐term rates of preventable hospitalizations. These effects dissipate over time but reveal how political‐electoral dynamics shape implementation. Such dynamics undermine the expected benefits of administrative capacity, suggesting that political oversight patterns condition policy outcomes. Evidence on funding concentration indicates that, in contexts of politically allocated funding, administrative capacity may facilitate the rapid execution of concentrated, electoral‐driven allocations, which can amplify inefficiencies. These findings highlight the importance of aligning legislative budget governance with local administrative capacity to mitigate the risks of funding fragmentation and ensure more effective governance of distributive policies.