Institutional Backsliding Under Liberal Democratic Backsliding: Central Bank Independence Reversal in Türkiye

Original

Institutional Backsliding Under Liberal Democratic Backsliding: Central Bank Independence Reversal in Türkiye

Caner Bakir

Abstract

ABSTRACT Despite the importance of research strands in identifying the micro‐mechanisms underpinning illiberal governance and democratic backsliding under populist or patrimonial rule in both liberal and illiberal democracies, the implications of populist‐patrimonial interventions by strong political leaders aiming for institutional backsliding have not been studied in detail. Drawing on a within‐case temporal comparison of erosion of central bank independence in Turkiye under the prolonged rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this article focuses on the backsliding of legal‐rational institutional logic (e.g., loyalty to legal and professional rules and practices such as impersonality, neutrality, professionalism, and meritocracy) that informs political leader and bureaucrat interactions and their replacement with patrimonial institutional logic (e.g., absolute personal loyalty to a leader). It argues that the disruptive (defensive) institutional work of populist‐patrimonial strongman (insiders) is most likely to be effective in achieving institutional backsliding (maintenance) in public administration when the political regime structure, its main institutions, and agential‐level factors motivate and empower his prolonged, consistent, and persistent disruptive (defensive) institutional work.