Original
The Safety Tether: How China Manages Civil Society Through Lawfare
Abstract
ABSTRACT How do authoritarian regimes benefit from civil society organizations' expertise and capacity while mitigating the potential risks they pose? Using machine learning and interrupted time series modeling of an original custom‐annotated dataset of all historical NGO registrations in China, we find that NGO policy is unevenly implemented. This unevenness, however, is not random. China uses NGO registration policies to facilitate local risk utility tradeoffs in line with threat perceptions and governance needs. This, we argue, is a form of lawfare—using legal means to achieve political or repressive ends. Examining a 2013 policy shift, we find local governments relax sponsorship requirements more in policy domains with low state capacity and less where civil society poses a threat, tailoring national mandates to shape local conditions. We show how lawfare is a complex instrument providing local flexibility in repression and cooptation of civil society, under the guise of routine legal and administrative procedures.
中文
安全系绳：中国如何通过法律战管理公民社会
摘要
威权政体如何既能受益于公民社会组织的专业知识和能力，又能缓解其可能带来的风险？我们使用机器学习与中断时间序列模型，分析一个原创的、经定制标注的中国全部历史性NGO注册数据集，发现NGO政策执行并不均衡。然而，这种不均衡并非随机。中国利用NGO注册政策来促进地方在风险与效用之间的权衡，以契合其威胁认知和治理需求。我们认为，这是一种法律战形式——即利用法律手段实现政治或压制性目的。通过考察2013年的政策转变，我们发现，在低国家能力的政策领域，地方政府更多放宽业务主管单位要求；而在公民社会构成威胁的领域则较少放宽，从而将国家指令因地制宜地塑造地方条件。我们展示了法律战如何成为一种复杂工具，在常规法律与行政程序的外衣下，为地方在压制与吸纳公民社会方面提供灵活性。
关键词
中国、公民社会、非政府组织、法律战、威权治理、国家能力、政策执行、机器学习