Original
When Bureaucrats Deviate: Mission Motivation, Autonomy, and Policy Implementation in Thai District Governance
Abstract
ABSTRACT Drawing on interviews and survey data from street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs) in eight Thai districts, we examine how mission motivation and autonomy combine to shape key SLB behaviors: policy compliance, policy customization, self‐directed action, and pro‐social rule‐breaking. We focus on how SLBs navigate the tension between delivering “up” to Bangkok and delivering “down” to citizens when they perceive these demands to be in conflict. We find substantial variation in how bureaucrats respond to this dilemma, which is potentially mediated by their professional environment (peer and leader interactions) and individual traits (such as rebelliousness and creativity). Leveraging Thailand's unusual combination of high mission motivation and de facto decentralized discretion within a formally centralized system, we show how autonomy can create the space for bureaucrats to prioritize local welfare over strict compliance. In doing so, we highlight the psychological and organizational mechanisms that link mission motivation to SLB behavior and illuminate how de facto decentralization shapes the public administration citizens experience.
中文
当官僚偏离时：使命动机、自主性与泰国区级治理中的政策执行
摘要
摘要 基于对泰国八个区级一线官僚（SLBs）的访谈和调查数据，我们考察使命动机与自主性如何结合，塑造一线官僚的关键行为：政策遵从、政策定制、自主行动和亲社会性违规。我们重点关注当一线官僚认为向曼谷“向上”交付与向公民“向下”交付的要求相互冲突时，他们如何应对这一张力。我们发现，官僚对这一困境的回应存在显著差异，这可能受到其职业环境（同侪与领导互动）和个人特质（如叛逆性和创造力）的中介影响。借助泰国在形式上集权体制内却拥有高度使命动机与事实上的分散化自由裁量权这一不寻常组合，我们展示自主性如何为官僚创造空间，使其将地方福祉置于严格遵从之上。由此，我们凸显将使命动机与一线官僚行为相连接的心理与组织机制，并阐明事实上的分权如何塑造公民所体验的公共行政。
关键词
一线官僚、使命动机、自主性、政策执行、泰国、事实分权、自由裁量权、亲社会违规