Original
Do Medical Health Ministers Make Different Health System Choices?
Abstract
ABSTRACT Healthcare decision‐making is a highly specialized domain of government, particularly at the central or federal level, which may partly explain why medical professionals are sometimes appointed to ministerial roles within government cabinets. However, does a minister with medical expertise in healthcare make a difference in the outcomes and outputs of a health system? We examine original data on the medical doctor (MD) backgrounds of health ministers in Western countries to disentangle these effects. Drawing on longitudinal evidence from a long panel of OECD countries over 21 years, and a differences in differences design we find that, although MD ministers do not increase overall healthcare spending, they do engage in some level of strategic budget reallocation by spending 11%–14% more on preventative care such as vaccines, irrespective of political leanings, though results are weaker under coalition governments. Notably, we find some evidence that MD ministers reduce overall mortality and increase the density of physicians in European Union (EU) countries and nurses in small countries.
中文
医学背景的卫生部长会做出不同的卫生体系选择吗？
摘要
摘要：医疗决策是政府中高度专业化的领域，尤其是在中央或联邦层面，这或许部分解释了为何医学专业人士有时会被任命为政府内阁中的部长职务。然而，具有医疗专业知识的部长是否会改变卫生系统的结果和产出？我们考察了西方国家卫生部长是否拥有医学博士（MD）背景的原始数据，以厘清这些效应。基于OECD国家21年的长期面板数据和双重差分设计，我们发现，尽管拥有医学博士学位的部长不会增加整体医疗支出，但他们确实会在一定程度上进行战略性预算再分配，将预防性护理（如疫苗）支出增加11%–14%，且无论其政治倾向如何，不过在联合政府下结果较弱。值得注意的是，我们发现一些证据表明，医学博士部长会降低欧盟国家的总体死亡率，并提高欧盟国家的医生密度以及小国的护士密度。
关键词
卫生部长、医学背景、卫生系统、预防性护理、卫生支出、死亡率、医生密度、双重差分