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Trust Me, I'm an Expert: Evaluating the Relation Between Expertise and Trust in Regulators

GOV 39/3

2026-04-17

Original

Trust Me, I'm an Expert: Evaluating the Relation Between Expertise and Trust in Regulators

Bastiaan Redert, Edoardo Guaschino, Ixchel Pérez‐Durán, Yannis Papadopoulos, Koen Verhoest, Juan Carlos Triviño‐Salazar

Abstract

ABSTRACT Trust is central to research on regulatory governance, underpinning both the legitimacy and effectiveness of regulatory bodies. Yet, while its importance is often assumed, less is known about its organizational drivers. Departing from the idea that regulatory agencies are expert‐based organizations within their fields, we argue that trust depends on the composition of regulators' staff, through the mechanisms of competence and goodwill. Using survey data from 1385 respondents across three policy sectors and six countries, combined with biographical information on regulators' staff, we examine how educational attainment and professional experience affect trust. Multilevel analyses show that – contrary to expectations about competence – educational attainment does not significantly influence trust, while prior private sector experience among regulatory staff tends to lower overall trust in regulators. However, this effect is conditioned by actor type: representatives of private interests display higher trust when regulators' staff have private sector experience, whereas public‐interest actors trust regulators less. This demonstrates how shared professional backgrounds may signal mutual goodwill among some actors, but also raise concerns about impartiality and capture among others. The paper contributes to scholarship on regulatory legitimacy and organizational design by demonstrating how the expertise and professional backgrounds of regulators' staff shape the perceived trustworthiness of regulatory bodies by various stakeholders.

中文

相信我,我是专家:评估监管者专业知识与信任之间的关系

Bastiaan Redert, Edoardo Guaschino, Ixchel Pérez‐Durán, Yannis Papadopoulos, Koen Verhoest, Juan Carlos Triviño‐Salazar

摘要

摘要:信任是监管治理研究的核心,支撑着监管机构的合法性与有效性。然而,尽管其重要性常被预设,人们对其组织层面驱动因素的了解仍相对不足。我们从监管机构是其领域内以专业知识为基础的组织这一观点出发,认为信任取决于监管者的人员构成,并通过能力与善意机制发挥作用。我们使用来自三个政策领域、六个国家的1385名受访者的调查数据,并结合监管机构人员的履历信息,考察教育程度与职业经历如何影响信任。多层次分析表明——与关于能力的预期相反——教育程度并未显著影响信任,而监管人员此前的私营部门经历往往会降低对监管者的总体信任。然而,这一效应受到行动者类型的调节:私营利益代表在监管人员具有私营部门经历时表现出更高的信任,而公共利益行动者则对监管者信任更低。这表明,共同的职业背景可能向某些行动者传递相互善意的信号,但也引发了另一些行动者对公正性与俘获的担忧。本文通过揭示监管人员的专业知识与职业背景如何塑造不同利益相关者对监管机构可信度的感知,为关于监管合法性与组织设计的研究作出贡献。

关键词

监管治理、信任、专业知识、监管机构、组织驱动因素、人员构成、合法性、监管俘获