Original
Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests a theory of how presidents use government agencies to manage legislative coalitions in multiparty presidential systems. We argue that agency decisions—particularly subsidized credit from state‐owned development banks—function as retail coalition goods that sustain legislative support. Legislators are more likely to back the president when agency resources benefit subnational politicians who are both partisan allies and vital to their reelection networks. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections in Brazil and loan‐level data from the National Development Bank (BNDES), we find that municipalities governed by coalition‐aligned mayors receive significantly more favorable loan terms. Linking these data to roll‐call votes, we show that legislators become more supportive of the president after loans are granted in their electoral strongholds managed by co‐partisan mayors. These findings reveal how distributive agency decisions translate into legislative support, integrating bureaucratic discretion into theories of coalition management.
中文
供养联盟：总统如何利用国有银行购买立法支持以维持治理能力
摘要
本文构建并检验了一种关于总统如何利用政府机构在多党总统制中管理立法联盟的理论。我们认为，机构决策——尤其是国有开发银行提供的补贴信贷——发挥着零售型联盟商品的作用，以维持立法支持。当机构资源使那些既是党派盟友又对其连任网络至关重要的次国家政治家受益时，议员更有可能支持总统。本文利用巴西市长选举接近结果的断点回归设计以及国家开发银行（BNDES）的贷款层面数据，发现由联盟结盟市长执政的市镇获得的贷款条件显著更优惠。将这些数据与点名投票相链接，我们表明，在由同党市长管理的议员选举据点获得贷款后，议员对总统的支持度上升。这些发现揭示了分配性机构决策如何转化为立法支持，从而将官僚裁量纳入联盟管理理论。
关键词
联盟管理、总统制、国有开发银行、补贴信贷、立法支持、断点回归、巴西、官僚裁量