Original
Efficient Production without Domination: The Case of Labor-Managed Firms
Abstract
Labor-managed firms, whether in the form of worker cooperatives, codetermination, or broad-based employee ownership, have recently prompted substantial public debate, to which political theorists have contributed with normative analyses that are seriously deficient insofar as they have neglected considerations of productive efficiency. I offer a normative view of labor-managed firms that leans squarely on efficiency considerations. I first argue that the value of productive efficiency is grounded not only on the interests of capital suppliers and society at large, but also on workers’ interest in avoiding domination by their bosses, and examine how efficiency may serve and set back this interest. I next argue that some variants of labor-managed firms can secure efficient production while protecting workers’ interest in nondomination more robustly than capital-controlled firms. Finally, I compare labor-managed firms to alternatives to achieve these aims, including self-employment, workplace regulation, unionization, and labor market policies to enhance workers’ exit options.
中文
高效生产与免于支配：劳动管理型企业案例
摘要
劳动管理型企业，无论是工人合作社、共同决定制还是广泛员工持股形式，近来引发了大量公共辩论；政治理论家以规范性分析参与其中，但这些分析存在严重缺陷，因为它们忽视了生产效率方面的考量。我提出一种关于劳动管理型企业的规范性观点，其明确倚重效率考量。我首先论证，生产效率的价值不仅建立在资本提供者和社会整体利益之上，也建立在工人避免受其老板支配的利益之上，并考察效率如何可能促进或损害这一利益。接着我论证，某些劳动管理型企业变体既能保障高效生产，又能比资本控制型企业更有力地保护工人免于支配的利益。最后，我将劳动管理型企业与实现这些目标的其他替代方案进行比较，包括自雇、工作场所监管、工会化，以及增强工人退出选项的劳动力市场政策。
关键词
劳动管理型企业、工人合作社、生产效率、无支配、共同决定制、员工持股、工会化、劳动力市场政策