Original
Contested Governance and Civilian Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in India
Abstract
How does contested governance by states and competing armed actors affect the behavior of the governed? During civil conflicts, rebel organizations frequently provide public goods, judicial arbitration, and security, but these forms of governance often operate alongside local state institutions. Beyond avoiding violence, therefore, noncombatants must navigate the daily uncertainty of local governance by states and armed groups vying for territorial control. This, we argue, shapes their quotidian interactions with one another. Using a series of lab-in-the-field experiments and surveys from Naxal-affected Bihar, India, we find that individuals living under such contested governance exhibit greater interpersonal trust and trustworthiness and less opportunistic behavior. We propose two mechanisms to explain these patterns—fearing intra-community retaliation or substituting for the state with interpersonal reliance. Most evidence is only consistent with the latter. By connecting governance, rebellion, and social capital, this work makes important contributions toward understanding the micro-politics of local order during longstanding armed conflicts.
中文
争夺性治理与平民亲社会行为：来自印度实地实验室实验的证据
摘要
国家与相互竞争的武装行为体的争夺性治理如何影响被治理者的行为？在内战期间，叛乱组织频繁提供公共物品、司法仲裁和安全，但这些治理形式往往与地方国家机构并存。因此，除了避免暴力之外，非战斗人员还必须应对国家与武装团体争夺领土控制所导致的日常地方治理不确定性。我们认为，这塑造了他们彼此之间的日常互动。利用来自印度受纳萨尔影响比哈尔邦的一系列实地实验室实验和调查，我们发现，生活在这种争夺性治理下的人表现出更高的人际信任和可信赖性，以及更少的机会主义行为。我们提出两种机制来解释这些模式——担心社区内部报复，或以人际依赖替代国家。大多数证据只与后者一致。通过将治理、叛乱和社会资本联系起来，这项研究对理解长期武装冲突期间地方秩序的微观政治作出了重要贡献。
关键词
争夺性治理、平民亲社会行为、内战、叛乱治理、社会资本、人际信任、实地实验室实验、印度