Original
State-Building in the City: An Experiment in Civilian Alternatives to Policing
Abstract
We helped design and evaluate a statebuilding intervention in Medellín, Colombia. The municipal government dramatically intensified nonpolice state presence in 40 neighborhoods over 20 months. On average, perceptions of security and legitimacy changed negligibly, suggesting that returns to statebuilding investments are generally low, at least within electoral cycles. Prespecified heterogeneity analysis, however, reveals significant increases in security and legitimacy where state governance began relatively higher, while impacts were null or possibly negative where it began lower. This suggests increasing rather than diminishing returns to statebuilding. The divergence apparently resulted from city officials under-delivering in initially lower-governance sectors. One reason might be “start-up costs” in statebuilding. Alternatively, both initial state penetration and incentives to implement new programs might depend on neighborhoods’ ability to hold agencies accountable. Whatever their source, increasing returns could drive persistent “neglect traps”—channeling political attention and investment to areas where state penetration is already robust, reinforcing existing disparities.
中文
城市中的国家建设：警务的民事替代方案实验
摘要
我们协助设计并评估了哥伦比亚麦德林的一项国家建设干预。市政府在20个月内在40个社区大幅加强了非警察的国家存在。平均而言，安全感和合法性感知的变化微乎其微，这表明国家建设投资的回报总体较低，至少在选举周期内如此。然而，预先设定的异质性分析显示，在国家治理初始水平相对较高的地方，安全感和合法性显著提升；而在初始水平较低的地方，影响为零或可能为负。这表明国家建设存在递增而非递减的回报。这种分化显然源于市政府在初始治理较低的部门交付不足。原因之一可能是国家建设中的“启动成本”。或者，初始国家渗透和推行新项目的激励可能都取决于社区让机构问责的能力。无论其来源如何，递增回报可能导致持续的“忽视陷阱”——将政治注意力和投资引向国家渗透已经稳固的地区，从而强化既有差距。
关键词
国家建设、警务替代、实地实验、哥伦比亚、麦德林、合法性、安全、忽视陷阱