Original
Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Postindependence Tanzania
Abstract
How do candidate selection processes shape policy outcomes? Studying Tanzania’s initial single-party legislative elections, I assess how electing candidates preferred by party elites affected policy implementation, which emphasized rural development during this period. Leveraging the deterministic assignment of ballot symbols—which was orthogonal to candidate characteristics but had large electoral effects—finds that their election substantially increased the supply of salient local public goods. Assembling novel candidate-level data, I document that elites prioritized candidates’ national prominence while voters prioritized their local ties. Rather than representing misaligned incentives, the results are consistent with elites, in an incipient regime, more quickly understanding which characteristics would matter for candidates’ performance in office. Beyond highlighting novel conditions under which elite-led candidate selection facilitates responsiveness, the results underscore the distributive consequences of candidate selection even in nondemocratic settings.
中文
精英最懂吗？坦桑尼亚独立后的候选人遴选与政策实施
摘要
候选人遴选过程如何塑造政策结果？通过研究坦桑尼亚最初的单一政党立法选举，我评估选举由政党精英偏好的候选人如何影响政策实施，而该时期政策实施强调农村发展。利用选票符号的确定性分配——其与候选人特征正交，但对选举结果有巨大影响——发现他们的当选大幅增加了显著地方公共物品的供给。通过汇编新颖的候选人层面数据，我记录了精英优先考虑候选人的全国声望，而选民优先考虑其地方联系。结果并非反映激励错位，而是与以下情况一致：在一个初生政权中，精英更快地理解哪些特征对候选人的任职表现重要。除了揭示精英主导的候选人遴选促进回应性的新条件外，结果还强调了即使在非民主环境中候选人遴选的分配后果。
关键词
候选人遴选、政策实施、坦桑尼亚、单一政党选举、地方公共物品、精英政治、选民偏好、非民主政权