Original
Scrutiny and Recall: Rousseau on Controlling the Executive
Abstract
In recent decades, political theorists have drawn on historical thinkers to explore how political elites can be held accountable. Rousseau, however, is often dismissed as reducing accountability to elections and participation to occasional ratification referenda. This article challenges that view. While Rousseau expected an elective aristocracy to execute laws ratified by the people, he also identified two mechanisms—scrutiny and recall—through which citizens could control these representatives. After reconstructing Rousseau’s account, I consider how these mechanisms could be adapted to contemporary democracies. Focused on executive accountability, the model is particularly suited to presidential systems with directly elected presidents. It combines a national jury—a citizens’ assembly chosen by lot and tasked with examining presidential actions—with the possibility of a recall referendum. By uniting deliberative scrutiny with the power to remove the head of state, this approach offers an underexplored complement to recent anti-oligarchic institutional innovations based on sortition.
中文
审查与罢免：卢梭论控制行政权
摘要
近几十年来，政治理论家借助历史上的思想家来探讨政治精英如何被问责。然而，卢梭常被贬低为将问责化约为选举，将参与化约为偶尔的批准性公投。本文挑战这一观点。尽管卢梭期待一个选举贵族制来执行人民批准的法律，他也指出了两种机制——审查与罢免——公民可通过它们控制这些代表。在重构卢梭的论述之后，我思考这些机制如何能够适应于当代民主。该模型聚焦于行政问责，尤其适合具有直选总统的总统制。它将一个全国陪审团——一个由抽签选出、负责审查总统行为的公民大会——与罢免公投的可能性结合起来。通过将审议性审查与罢免国家元首的权力相结合，这一路径为近期基于抽签的反寡头制度创新提供了一种尚未被充分探讨的补充。
关键词
卢梭、行政问责、审查、罢免、抽签、公民议会、总统制、民主理论