Original
Captured participatory institutions: Theory and evidence from Venezuela's Consejos Comunales
Abstract
Abstract Can participatory institutions (PIs) facilitate development when captured by the government? We propose an original theoretical framework to investigate how changing incumbent priorities can shape the developmental and political effects of captured PIs. While patrons concerned with survival can force PIs to specialize in political activities, those pursuing regime consolidation may incentivize PIs to multitask, delivering developmental gains and political rewards. We deploy our framework to study Venezuela's Communal Councils. Leveraging difference‐in‐differences analyses, an original survey of Council participants, and 51 interviews with government officials and grassroots Communal Council members, we find that Councils yielded both economic and political returns during an early period marked by political stability and regime consolidation. However, as Venezuela's economic collapse pushed the government into an authoritarian survival mode, Councils became politically specialized. While showing that captured PIs can foster development under certain circumstances, our findings cast doubt on PIs’ development‐enhancing potential under autocracy.
中文
被俘获的参与式制度：来自委内瑞拉社区委员会的理论与证据
摘要
参与式制度（PIs）在被政府俘获时能否促进发展？我们提出一个原创理论框架，以考察执政者优先事项的变化如何塑造被俘获参与式制度的发展效应与政治效应。关注生存的庇护者可能迫使参与式制度专门从事政治活动，而追求政权巩固的庇护者则可能激励参与式制度承担多重任务，从而产生发展收益与政治回报。我们运用该框架研究委内瑞拉的社区委员会。借助双重差分分析、一项针对社区委员会参与者的原创调查，以及对政府官员和基层社区委员会成员的51次访谈，我们发现，在政治稳定和政权巩固的早期阶段，社区委员会带来了经济回报与政治回报。然而，随着委内瑞拉的经济崩溃将政府推入威权生存模式，社区委员会在政治上变得专门化。我们的研究虽然表明被俘获的参与式制度在特定情况下能够促进发展，但也对参与式制度在威权体制下的发展促进潜力提出了质疑。
关键词
参与式制度、社区委员会、委内瑞拉、政权巩固、威权主义、双重差分、发展、政治俘获