Original
Vote buying and negative agenda control: A problem for the study of money in politics
Abstract
Abstract Politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens frequently argue that money has an outsized influence on US politics. Yet research on the effect of money on politicians' behavior finds limited effects, especially on voting behavior. I construct a formal model to show that these limited effects may be an artifact of the institutional powers of agenda setters, and the strategic nature of the data generating process. The model predicts that, under general conditions, vote buying against proposals can occur with no vote held, and that vote buying is most likely when uncertainty is high, the interest group and agenda setter are extreme, and the pivotal legislator is moderate. I argue that these conditions held during the 2021 negotiations over the Build Back Better Act. Using a synthetic control design, I test whether the swing voters in the Senate received more campaign contributions than they would have otherwise, finding evidence consistent with the model.
中文
选票购买与消极议程控制：政治资金研究中的一个问题
摘要
摘要：政治家、权威评论人士和普通公民经常主张，金钱对美国政治具有过大的影响力。然而，关于金钱对政治家行为影响的研究却发现影响有限，尤其是在投票行为上。我构建一个形式模型来表明，这些有限影响可能源于议程设定者的制度性权力以及数据生成过程的策略性本质。该模型预测，在一般条件下，针对提案的选票购买可以在未举行投票的情况下发生；并且当不确定性高、利益集团与议程设定者立场极端、关键立法者立场温和时，选票购买最可能发生。我认为这些条件在2021年围绕《重建更好法案》的谈判期间成立。利用合成控制设计，我检验了参议院中的摇摆议员是否获得了比原本更多的竞选捐款，并发现了与该模型一致的证据。
关键词
选票购买、消极议程控制、政治资金、议程设定、竞选捐款、合成控制、美国参议院