Original
Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures
Abstract
Abstract Nondemocratic regimes sometimes benefit from tolerating the expression of critical opinions and visions for policy in their legislatures. Doing so enables them to gather important information about societal preferences, to co‐opt potential challengers, and to address other threats to their control. In these cases, regimes and deputies exhibit mutual restraint: deputies respect regime‐set limits on their freedom to express critical opinions, while regimes refrain from punishing deputies for expressing negative views when the stakes are acceptably low. By examining both the responsiveness of individual deputies and how regimes police the limits of acceptable behavior, we are better able to identify both the functions and strengths of nondemocratic legislatures. I illustrate these dynamics using data about deputy voting behavior and legislative success in the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh (2016–2020).
中文
非民主立法机构中的相互克制
摘要
非民主政体有时会因容忍其立法机构中批评性意见和政策愿景的表达而受益。这样做使它们能够收集关于社会偏好的重要信息，吸纳潜在挑战者，并应对对其控制的其他威胁。在这些情况下，政体与议员表现出相互克制：议员尊重政体对其表达批评性意见的自由所设定的限制，而政体在风险可接受地较低时，也不因议员表达负面观点而惩罚他们。通过考察个别议员的回应性以及政体如何管控可接受行为的界限，我们能够更好地识别非民主立法机构的功能与优势。我利用关于吉尔吉斯斯坦最高会议（Jogorku Kenesh，2016—2020年）议员投票行为和立法成功的数据来说明这些动态。
关键词
非民主立法机构、相互克制、威权政体、议员投票行为、立法成功率、吉尔吉斯斯坦、政治表达、议会