JPART — 2026-06-05
Original Awareness, costs, and take-up of social benefits: evidence from a field experiment in China
Wenchi Wei, Xin Chen, Xing Ni
PAR — 2026-06-04
Original Which Type of AI ‐Based Public Services Are Citizens More Willing to Accept?
Qing Miao, Lin Han Yu
PA — 2026-06-04
Original Unraveling Bureaucratic Procrastination: Probabilistically Sufficient Factors and Necessary Conditions
Xi Zhang, Bo Yan, Bin Chen, Long Wu, Yao Liu
Abstract
ABSTRACT When confronted with demanding workloads and limited resources, grassroots bureaucrats may resort to procrastinating on tasks as a coping strategy. This study integrates the Stimulus‐Organism‐Response (SOR) model, the Social Cognitive Theory (SCT), and the Conservation of Resources (COR) theory to unravel the multi‐layered drivers of bureaucratic procrastination. Using survey data from Chinese grassroots bureaucrats, we employed a dual‐logic approach that incorporated the perspectives of both sufficiency and necessity. The results, visualized through Bottleneck Importance‐Performance Map Analysis (BIPMA), reveal a hierarchy for interventions. Organizational identification emerges as the highest priority, functioning as both a potent sufficient factor and a critical necessary condition. Self‐efficacy serves as a moderate obstacle for specific subgroups who require targeted support, while public service motivation acts as a foundational prerequisite that warrants ongoing maintenance rather than active enhancement. Combined with strategies to mitigate emotional exhaustion, these insights can facilitate a more targeted allocation of resources to curtail bureaucratic procrastination. This research advances the study of bureaucratic behavior by providing actionable guidance to mitigate bureaucratic procrastination and also by offering a methodological contribution through the application of dual‐logic analysis to complex organizational phenomena.
CQ — pp. 1-17 2026-06-04 Original The Afterlife of Problem Judgments: Case Review, Discipline and Judicial Accountability in China
Kwai Hang Ng, Peter C.H. Chan
Abstract
Abstract This article examines the reality of “let the adjudicator judge” by investigating how Chinese judges are held accountable for their judgments under the expanded ex post case review system. We examine the first three years of the implementation of this headline initiative in a grassroots court (Court T) located in a major city in China. Our data include the internal quarterly reports produced by the court’s case review committee and interviews with judges. The assessments went beyond legal analysis, commenting on matters such as work ethic, diligence and moral sensibilities. Frontline judges view the review system as subjective and arbitrary. The new mechanism, however, alters the power dynamics between senior judges and their subordinates. While frontline judges no longer require pre-approval from senior judges, they rely on the goodwill of those same seniors to navigate the review process. Within this ostensibly freer framework, frontline judges are subjected to a more diffuse but pervasive form of discipline. Our analysis reveals how the adjudication committee, far from being sidelined, has shifted its role, concentrating ex ante supervision on a minority of difficult cases while holding judges accountable through ex post reviews of flawed judgments. The article further underscores the challenges of disentangling legal analysis from political supervision in a framework of authoritative legality.
CQ 266 pp. 325-344 2026-06-04 Original Bureaucratic Restructuring and the State-led (De-)Financialization of Local Governance in China
Xuchen Zhang, Fenghua Pan
Abstract
Abstract State-led financialization has emerged as a salient feature of local governance in China, yet it remains underexplored through the lens of bureaucratic restructuring. This paper traces the evolution of local financial agencies since 2002 through four distinct stages: local financial offices ( jinrongban ), financial bureaus ( jinrongju ), financial regulatory bureaus ( jinrong jianguanju ) and financial commissions ( jinrongwei ). Initially, local governments established jinrongban to harness financial capital for regional development. By proactively connecting local firms with capital markets to facilitate corporate listings, they embedded financial logic into local governance, reflecting local state-led financialization. Subsequently, the central government formalized these bodies into jinrongju with expanded mandates, deepening state-led financialization. Later, it systematically devolved regulatory responsibilities and renamed them jinrong jianguanju , elevating regulatory functions to a top priority, illustrating how the central government selectively steered the direction of financialization. Ultimately, provincial agencies were reorganized into jinrongwei and stripped of development functions, while city-level counterparts were largely closed, signifying a shift towards central state-led de-financialization. This trajectory was driven by shifting central–local dynamics, as early bottom-up initiatives were superseded by top-down control. The bureaucratic restructuring examined in this study offers new insights into the state-led (de-)financialization of local governance in China.
AJPS — 2026-06-03
Original The demand for elections under autocracy: Regime approval and the elimination of local elections in Russia
Quintin H. Beazer, Noah Buckley, Ora John Reuter
CQ 266 pp. 453-469 2026-06-03 Original Desperate Acts of Democracy: Identity Threat, Autocratization and Voter Turnout in Hong Kong
Lev Nachman, Nathan Kar Ming Chan, Chit Wai John Mok
PA — 2026-06-03
Original Balancing Neutral and Responsive Competences in the Context of Functional Politicization
Niels Opstrup, Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen, Caroline Howard Grøn, Anders Ryom Villadsen
GOV 39/3 2026-06-02
Original When Bureaucrats Deviate: Mission Motivation, Autonomy, and Policy Implementation in Thai District Governance
Dan Honig, Eleanor F. Woodhouse
Abstract
ABSTRACT Drawing on interviews and survey data from street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs) in eight Thai districts, we examine how mission motivation and autonomy combine to shape key SLB behaviors: policy compliance, policy customization, self‐directed action, and pro‐social rule‐breaking. We focus on how SLBs navigate the tension between delivering “up” to Bangkok and delivering “down” to citizens when they perceive these demands to be in conflict. We find substantial variation in how bureaucrats respond to this dilemma, which is potentially mediated by their professional environment (peer and leader interactions) and individual traits (such as rebelliousness and creativity). Leveraging Thailand's unusual combination of high mission motivation and de facto decentralized discretion within a formally centralized system, we show how autonomy can create the space for bureaucrats to prioritize local welfare over strict compliance. In doing so, we highlight the psychological and organizational mechanisms that link mission motivation to SLB behavior and illuminate how de facto decentralization shapes the public administration citizens experience.
JOP — 2026-06-02
Original Unpacking Compliance and "Leakages'' in International Regimes: The Case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
Lorenzo Crippa, Edmund Malesky, Lucio Picci