GOV 39/3 2026-07-04
Original Informational Crowding‐Out? Targeted Transparency, Environmental Nonprofits, and Public Concern in China
PMR — pp. 1-30 2026-07-02 Original The promise and performance of social impact bonds
Clare J. FitzGerald, Alec Fraser, Carolyn J. Heinrich, Mikkel Munksgaard Andersen
Abstract
This article examines social impact bonds (SIBs), first scrutinizing early discourse on their promises—increased accountability through competitive public-private partnerships, outcomes measurement, and a learning approach to performance management—drawing on theories of New Public Management and New Public Governance. Then, a structured review of empirical research is used to evaluate SIB performance against their public management reform promises. Findings show that while SIBs sometimes foster intersectoral collaboration, they can also surface power imbalances, institutionalize gaming, and inadvertently reduce public accountability. A faltering commitment to robust outcomes measurement is also demonstrated, with negative implications for effective governance and public value.
GOV 39/3 2026-07-02
Original Regulatory Governance in the Era of Populist Ascendancy: A Tug‐of‐War Between Independent Public Authorities and Central Government in Greece
JPART — 2026-07-02
Original Organizational strategies for system robustness: how managers navigate the institutional architecture of complex systems
Adam Wiechman, Aaron Deslatte, Elizabeth A Koebele, Margaret Garcia, John M Anderies
AJPS — 2026-07-02
Original Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India
Anustubh Agnihotri, Aditya Dasgupta, Devesh Kapur
JOP 88/3 pp. 1130-1144 2026-07-01 Original Who’s Persuasive? Understanding Citizen-to-Citizen Efforts to Change Minds
Martin Naunov, Carlos Rueda-Cañón, Timothy J. Ryan
WP 78/3 pp. 419-458 2026-07-01 Original Who Sets the Agenda? Diplomatic Experience and Small Power Influence in the United Nations
Sabrina B. Arias
Abstract
abstract: Why are some small powers effective in setting the UN agenda, even in the face of large power opposition? The author argues that small states are more likely to be represented by experienced diplomats, who, over time, accumulate influence that can be deployed to shape the international organization’s agenda. To test these claims, the author assembled a data set of proposed agenda items and the tenure of all states’ ambassadors from 1946 to 2018 and conducted interviews with diplomats from forty-nine states. The author finds that smaller powers have more diplomatic experience than larger powers; that individuals with more diplomatic experience are more successful at agenda setting even when accounting for material power; and that random shocks to ambassadorial tenure, such as the death of an ambassador, have negative effects on diplomatic experience and effectiveness. These insights contribute to understanding the role of individuals and diplomacy in international relations and the ways in which small powers influence international politics.
JOP 88/3 pp. 1066-1081 2026-07-01 Original Universal Mail Ballot Delivery Boosts Turnout: The Causal Effects of Sending Mail Ballots to All Registered Voters
R. Michael Alvarez, Yimeng Li
JOP 88/3 pp. 1231-1244 2026-07-01 Original Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment
Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Christian Siauwijaya
Abstract
International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and nonstate actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six United Nations organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.
JOP 88/3 pp. 952-966 2026-07-01 Original Toward Understanding Condonation of Gender-Based Violence: The Interaction of Patriarchal Values and Contextual Elements of Violence Against Women
James L. Gibson, Amanda Gouws