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Post‐instrument bias

AJPS — 2026-05-19 Original Post‐instrument bias Julian Schuessler, Adam N. Glynn, Miguel R. Rueda Abstract Abstract When using instrumental variables, researchers often assume that causal effects are only identified conditional on covariates. We show that the role of these covariates is often unclear and that there exists confusion regarding their ability to mitigate violations of the exclusion restriction. We explain when and how existing adjustment strategies may lead to “post‐instrument” bias. We then discuss assumptions that are sufficient to identify various treatment effects when adjustment for post‐instrument variables is required. In general, these assumptions are highly restrictive, albeit they sometimes are testable. We also show that other existing tests are possibly misleading. Then, we introduce a sensitivity analysis that uses information on variables influenced by the instrument to gauge the effect of potential violations of the exclusion restriction. We illustrate it using a published study and summarize our results in easy‐to‐understand guidelines.

How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work?

PAR 86/5 pp. 1225-1234 2026-05-19 Original How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work? Ben Merriman Abstract ABSTRACT Aggressive use of the administrative power of the presidency is a major source of public administrative concern about the health of American democracy. Many of these powers stem from executive branch reorganization in the late 1930s, which was conceived and implemented by founding figures in the modern field. Fear for democracy defined reorganization. Reorganizers elaborated a working theory about the conditions under which strong presidential administration could preserve and strengthen democracy: structured internal friction in the executive branch to recreate traditional checks on administrative conduct; identification and promotion of a corps of socially and politically astute administrators; and a watchful Congress. This design relied on a political approach to administration that created few managerial or legal safeguards. As subsequent polarization has altered the political order under which executive reorganization was conceived, the institutional powers of the presidency have emerged as a threat to democratic arrangements, rather than a bulwark.

Breaking barriers: How an international treaty for women reduces the size of the informal economy

AJPS — 2026-05-19 Original Breaking barriers: How an international treaty for women reduces the size of the informal economy Chris Gahagan Abstract Abstract Prior research on the role the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has improving women's outcomes has shown ratification results in increased political and social rights, yet no improvements in economic rights. I challenge prior findings by providing evidence that CEDAW improves women's economic rights by reducing gendered legal barriers to employment. I also demonstrate CEDAW has unexpected but desirable downstream consequences that further improve women's economic outcomes by facilitating movement from the informal to the formal economy. Through matching within a difference‐in‐differences design, I show ratifying countries experience a significant increase in women's equality of economic opportunity and a significant decrease in the size of the informal economy. These results hold under multiple robustness checks and placebo tests. By examining specific outcomes that are relevant to CEDAW, I offer greater insight into CEDAW's impact on women's economic outcomes than previous research has afforded.

Outpaced by platforms: how employment services for immigrants struggle to keep pace

PMR — pp. 1-25 2026-05-18 Original Outpaced by platforms: how employment services for immigrants struggle to keep pace Atieh Razavi Yekta, Suzanne Huot Abstract Immigrants are overrepresented in Canada’s platform economy, yet platform work is not characterized as legitimate and sustainable within employment services shaped by New Public Management (NPM) and austerity policies. This focused ethnography interrogates limitations of NPM and uses a sociotechnical approach to analyse key informant interviews. Three themes are addressed: (1) Out of scope: the limits of current policy, (2) Systemic lags and the unknowns of platform work and (3) Reproducing racial and cultural inequalities in platform work. Findings show that narrow performance metrics, competitive funding and depoliticized environments marginalize platform workers, constrain innovation and suppress culturally responsive advocacy.

Gender Quota Laws and Women in Cabinets

JOP — 2026-05-18 Original Gender Quota Laws and Women in Cabinets Tiffany Barnes, Giulia Venturini, Ana Catalano Weeks Abstract Do legislative gender quotas increase women’s presence in cabinets? Women remain underrepresented in political leadership worldwide. As a remedy, over 80 countries have adopted gender quotas, requiring parties to nominate or elect a minimum share of women. But can quotas have effects beyond the positions they directly target? We argue that quotas increase the presence of women in executive cabinets by expanding the pool of experienced female legislators. Using a global dataset (168 countries) from 1990 to 2021, we find gender quotas increase the share of women ministers by 15 percent relative to the average baseline–including increases in both high- and lowprestige portfolios. Consistent with a supply-side mechanism, effects are largest in parliamentary democracies—where ministers are often selected from parliament—and in countries that experienced the greatest increases in women’s legislative representation post-quota. The findings suggest quotas can generate meaningful spillover effects at the highest levels of government.

The Politics of Privilege: Discrimination, Monopolized Social Rights, and Reform

APSR — pp. 1-13 2026-05-14 Original The Politics of Privilege: Discrimination, Monopolized Social Rights, and Reform ANDREW SABL Abstract This article analyzes three kinds of privilege—roughly, the monopoly or near-monopoly of a prized social good by a group—in terms of the political barriers facing attempts to reform them. Extending previous work, it distinguishes among discrimination privileges, which are zero-sum and relative, benefiting some groups at others’ expense; monopolized social right privileges, involving goods enjoyed only by some that can and should be extended to all; and differential treatment privileges, involving disagreement over whether a good currently monopolized by some should be extended to all or to none. The political barriers to reforming discrimination privilege involve group interest; those to reforming monopolized social rights include privilege, ignorance, cost, priorities, policy uncertainty, and the psychological wage. Differential treatment privilege is complicated. An exercise in applied political realism, this article treats normative categories as political inputs rather than philosophical conclusions and seeks to demonstrate the insights enabled by doing so.