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The money laundering market: An economic analysis

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512080123-e2512080123 2026-08-10 Original The money laundering market: An economic analysis Joras Ferwerda Abstract Criminals launder their proceeds from crime, either themselves or by paying a professional, to disguise the link between the criminal, the crime, and the proceeds. This allows the criminal to spend the proceeds more freely and lowers the chance of receiving unwanted attention from the authorities. This paper investigates the structure and dynamics of the understudied market for money laundering services. The analysis reveals that this illegal market is demand-driven and fragmented, with different forms of laundering, each requiring different steps with varying levels of risk. High search costs, specialized money launderers, and uncertainties lead to local monopolies. Demand tends to be relatively inelastic because criminals eventually need laundering services to spend their proceeds. Local monopolies, inelastic demand, and poor information flows lead to relatively high prices for laundering. Trust issues and two-sided asymmetric information lead to a market with relationships that tend to last longer than generally expected in illegal markets.

The market for human smuggling: Structure, mechanisms, and paradoxes

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2511019122-e2511019122 2026-08-10 Original The market for human smuggling: Structure, mechanisms, and paradoxes Paolo Campana Abstract Human smuggling is the facilitation of unlawful cross-border movement. It is primarily a commercial activity, offered as a service to willing, paying customers, and a large-scale market catering to millions seeking to circumvent mobility restrictions. Contrary to prevailing media and political narratives that depict smuggling as dominated by powerful and highly sophisticated criminal organizations, this study documents a fragmented, decentralized market composed of independent, localized actors operating through flexible, often temporary networks. These flexible arrangements, coupled with low barriers to entry, confer resilience and adaptability to the market, making enforcement difficult and resource-intensive. Intensified enforcement often produces unintended consequences, including heightened migrant vulnerability and increased reliance on smugglers. Despite regional differences, smuggling operations exhibit striking structural similarities shaped by local knowledge and monitoring costs. Such enduring structural characteristics exist alongside a growing role played by communication technologies, which are reshaping dynamics between service providers and customers. Ultimately, human smuggling remains a market fraught with paradoxes: Migrants face severe risks yet view smugglers as essential facilitators, while states confront the complex task of balancing border enforcement with humanitarian obligations and protections of vulnerable individuals.

The illegal market for sex in the United States: Insights from economic research

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512375122-e2512375122 2026-08-10 Original The illegal market for sex in the United States: Insights from economic research Manisha Shah Abstract The illegal market for sex in the United States generates significant economic activity yet remains understudied due to its illegality and clandestine nature. This paper synthesizes existing empirical evidence documenting aspects of market structure, impacts of regulation, and notable changes over time. Criminalization, while intended to suppress the market, often exacerbates harms by displacing activity underground, increasing violence against sex workers, and elevating disease transmission risks. Natural experiments, including decriminalization episodes in Rhode Island and policy shifts in Europe, reveal that decriminalization can reduce sexually transmitted infections and violence against women. Additionally, technological shifts-particularly the rise of online platforms due to the internet-have reshaped market organization. These findings challenge conventional legal and moral frameworks and underscore the need for evidence-based policymaking to guide effective regulation of sex markets.

Stability and turbulence in illegal drug markets

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512078123-e2512078123 2026-08-10 Original Stability and turbulence in illegal drug markets Beau Kilmer Abstract This article provides a primer on illegal drug markets, with a focus on the structure and nature of these markets and the enterprises involved. The markets for illegal drugs are large, with annual retail expenditures likely exceeding $100 billion in the United States alone. Many drugs are easy to produce, and their high value-to-weight ratios make them attractive to smugglers. Some features of illegal drug markets have been quite stable, such as the small size of retail purchases, in part because most sales are to people who use frequently and typically do not buy in bulk. Between production and consumption, most of these substances cross multiple borders-and often continents-and the mark-ups along the supply chain continue to be substantial. But there have been major changes over the past 15 y. While illegally manufactured synthetic drugs are not new, the proliferation of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids created an overdose crisis in North America and has other countries on high alert. The internet has also made producing and accessing a wide range of drugs and their precursor chemicals easier. The emergence of cryptocurrencies has created new opportunities to hide transactions and launder the proceeds. In addition to highlighting the stability and turbulence in these markets, this article offers ideas for future research and emphasizes the need for monitoring purity-adjusted drug prices, which is critical for understanding supply changes and evaluating interventions in these markets.

Endogenous coalition formation in policy debates

AJPS — 2026-08-10 Original Endogenous coalition formation in policy debates Philip Leifeld, Laurence Brandenberger Abstract Abstract Political actors form coalitions around their joint normative beliefs in order to influence the policy process on contentious issues such as climate change or population aging. Policy process theory maintains that learning within and across coalitions is a central predictor of policy change but has yet to explain how policy learning works. This article explains the formation and maintenance of coalitions by focusing on the ways actors adopt policy beliefs from other actors in policy debates. A policy debate is a complex social system in which temporal network dependence guides how actors contribute ideological statements. Belief adoption matters in three complementary ways: bonding , which exploits cues within coalitions; bridging , which explores new beliefs outside one's perimeter; and repulsion , which reinforces polarization between coalitions and cements their belief systems. We formalize this theory of endogenous coalition formation in policy debates and test it on a micro‐level empirical data set.

Durable majority gerrymanders: Where partisan gerrymandering can displace democracy

AJPS — 2026-08-10 Original Durable majority gerrymanders: Where partisan gerrymandering can displace democracy Maxwell Palmer, Benjamin Schneer Abstract Abstract We develop the concept of, and estimation tools for, durable majority gerrymanders : electoral district maps drawn to reduce an opposing political party's probability of winning a majority in a legislative chamber. Directly interpretable, forward‐looking, and motivated by the democratic principle that a party in power should have some chance of losing it, this measure provides new insights into the role of redistricting in state legislative elections. We show that, when map drawers are unconstrained, the ability to create durable majorities is so widespread that at least one party in every state can draw a map where a majority of legislative districts withstand almost any likely future electoral swing. Enacted maps are less durable due to a combination of underlying geography, voter partisanship, and state‐level guidelines. This paper provides the theoretical framework and empirical tools to understand which gerrymandered maps enable state‐level majorities to emerge and to endure.