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Polihot

Portraits of Power: Facial Appearance and the Tacit Domain of Political Selection in China

·659 字·2 分钟
Polihot 比较政治 公共行政 中国研究 Political Selection Facial Appearance China Bureaucracy AI
APSR — pp. 1-22 2026-06-22 Original Portraits of Power: Facial Appearance and the Tacit Domain of Political Selection in China JUNYAN JIANG, SONGPO YANG Abstract As the epitome of modern, rational organizations, bureaucracies are often believed to select candidates based on rules and reason. We argue that intuitive—and even instinctive—assessments of candidates’ external appearances sometimes underpin seemingly rational and calculated decisions. Using a novel, AI-based algorithm that learns and reproduces human assessments of facial appearances at scale, we examine how perceived facial traits influence the careers of over four thousand mid- and senior-level Chinese officials. We find that officials who look more competent, trustworthy, and less aggressive enjoy significantly better promotion prospects and lower purge risk than their peers. Warmth-related traits (e.g., trustworthiness and non-aggressiveness) are especially valued at higher-level promotions and for male candidates. Additional analyses, including conjoint experiments with real officials, demonstrate that appearances’ influence over selection preferences is comparable to performance or political connections. These findings challenge the prevailing meritocratic and relation-based theories of bureaucratic selection and highlight the role of impressions in the workings of government institutions.

Reclaiming Weber: Bureaucracy as Democracy's Last Line of Defense

·595 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 政治理论 Weber Bureaucracy Democratic Backsliding Public Service Ethics Compliance Trap
PAR 86/5 pp. 1213-1224 2026-06-21 Original Reclaiming Weber: Bureaucracy as Democracy's Last Line of Defense Patricia Nemeth Abstract ABSTRACT Max Weber's rational–legal bureaucracy remains a vital safeguard amid populist backlash, civil service politicization, and democratic backsliding. This article reframes bureaucracy as a conditional democratic safeguard—one that depends on ethical orientation and professional integrity, not technical capacity alone. When legality is hollowed out through obedience or anticipatory compliance, institutions corrode from within. Evidence from recent cases of executive politicization illustrates how ethical substance erodes behind formally intact institutions. By integrating Weber's structural rationality with Waldo's claim that democracy is fundamentally an ethic requiring value‐laden judgment, the article develops the notion of a “compliance trap” and recasts public servants as ethical constitutional agents rather than passive implementers. It also advances a framework for bureaucratic renewal grounded in ethical discipline, participatory design, and professional autonomy, arguing that administrators must be prepared to exercise principled judgment when other democratic safeguards weaken.

Policy Learning: Mapping the Conceptual Minefield

·771 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共政策 公共行政 Policy Learning Conceptual Clarity Public Policy Public Administration Knowledge Utilization
PSJ — 2026-06-21 Original Policy Learning: Mapping the Conceptual Minefield Bishoy Zaki Abstract ABSTRACT Policy learning has become a central and widely deployed lens in public policy and administration research. Yet policy learning's success has also produced paradoxical effects. Decades of scholarship have generated a dense conceptual terrain populated by numerous constructs and learning descriptors that are often unclearly positioned and frequently collapsed into the broad label of “learning types.” The result is persistent conceptual ambiguity that limits comparability and hinders cumulative knowledge production, leaving policy learning widely experienced as a “minefield” of overlapping constructs. This article addresses that problem by mapping the policy learning terrain through building an Archimedean device that develops four construct categories, forms , modes , mechanisms , and types of learning , anchored in two reference points: the occurrence of learning, defined as the deliberate pursuit and processing of policy‐relevant knowledge by policy actors, and learning outcomes, meaning what learning produces, ranging from stability to varying degrees of change. It maps a selected set of prominent constructs into these categories to provide a construct‐identity crosswalk and shared analytic grammar that support clearer specification, more defensible operationalization, and the space for more consistent cross‐study synthesis without erasing theoretical pluralism, and that can be layered onto existing learning frameworks for additional analytical leverage and theory development.

The Safety Tether: How China Manages Civil Society Through Lawfare

·604 字·2 分钟
Polihot 比较政治 公共行政 中国研究 China Civil Society NGOs Lawfare Authoritarian Governance
GOV 39/3 2026-06-19 Original The Safety Tether: How China Manages Civil Society Through Lawfare Timothy Hildebrandt, Blake Miller Abstract ABSTRACT How do authoritarian regimes benefit from civil society organizations' expertise and capacity while mitigating the potential risks they pose? Using machine learning and interrupted time series modeling of an original custom‐annotated dataset of all historical NGO registrations in China, we find that NGO policy is unevenly implemented. This unevenness, however, is not random. China uses NGO registration policies to facilitate local risk utility tradeoffs in line with threat perceptions and governance needs. This, we argue, is a form of lawfare—using legal means to achieve political or repressive ends. Examining a 2013 policy shift, we find local governments relax sponsorship requirements more in policy domains with low state capacity and less where civil society poses a threat, tailoring national mandates to shape local conditions. We show how lawfare is a complex instrument providing local flexibility in repression and cooptation of civil society, under the guise of routine legal and administrative procedures.

Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions

·536 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 政治经济学 State Auditors Selection Methods Partisanship Government Oversight Principal-Agent
PAR — 2026-06-19 Original Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions Lang (Kate) Yang Abstract ABSTRACT This study examines how the selection of public sector leaders affects organizational outcomes, especially in oversight functions where independence is expected. Political economy literature suggests that elected leaders better respond to voter preferences, while appointed leaders possess more expertise. Drawing on public administration theories of political control of the bureaucracy, we posit that, regardless of the selection method, public sector leaders as agents are subject to the influence of political principals with authority over the selection process. When the principal's interest is not aligned with the public interest, as seen in government oversight functions, its influence could compromise the performance of the selected leaders. Focusing on state auditors, the study finds that on average, selection methods are not correlated with audit findings, but an auditor whose political principal shares the same party affiliation as the auditee (the state governor) is less likely to identify financial management deficiencies.