JOP 88/3 pp. 1281-1285 2026-07-01 Original Does School Debating Reduce Vulnerability to Misinformation? A Field Experiment in Poland
Krzysztof Krakowski, Bernhard Clemm von Hohenberg, Davide Morisi
JOP 88/3 pp. 1245-1257 2026-07-01 Original Does Informing Partisans About Partisan Bias Reduce Partisan Bias?
Diogo Ferrari
Abstract
This registered report study examines whether informing partisans about the party cue effect reduces partisan bias in policy judgments. It employs an experimental design in which subjects are informed that party cues induce people who identify with a party to take policy positions because the party does and that there are potential drawbacks of relying on party cues instead of reflecting on the policy content. The hypothesis is that those who are aware of the party cue effect will be less likely to rely on party cues when making policy judgments compared to those who are not informed.
JOP 88/3 pp. 916-934 2026-07-01 Original Differently Divisive: Sexism, Racial Resentment, and Support for Candidates with Incongruent Views
Ryan Bell, Gabriel Borelli, Rafaela Dancygier, Daniel J. Hopkins, Jeremy Roth
WP 78/3 pp. 555-601 2026-07-01 Original Democratizing from Within: British Elites and the Expansion of the Franchise
Chitralekha Basu, Carles Boix, Sonia Giurumescu, Paulo Serôdio
JOP 88/3 pp. 1115-1129 2026-07-01 Original Cutting in Line: How Powerful Organized Interests Hasten and Delay Executive Branch Nominations
Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, Lauren Ratliff Santoro, Elizabeth Steffensmeier
JOP 88/3 pp. 967-982 2026-07-01 Original Bottom-Up? Top-Down? Determinants of Issue Attention in State Politics
Andreu Casas, Oscar Stuhler, Julia Payson, Joshua A. Tucker, Richard Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler
JOP 88/3 pp. 983-997 2026-07-01 Original An Agency Perspective on Immigration Federalism
Asya Magazinnik
Abstract
American local law enforcement agencies now engage in an unprecedented degree of cooperation with the federal government to police immigration in the nation’s interior. I argue that this regime of “cooperative federalism” in immigration enforcement is an intentional and strategic use of the federal executive’s authority. Drawing insight from the bureaucratic agency literature, I develop a formal model that analyzes the president’s decision to invite subnational participation in policymaking. An empirical analysis of the 287(g) program highlights the model’s central trade-off. By deputizing local officers with the powers of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, 287(g) allowed willing local participants to share the costs of enforcement with federal authorities. But the localities that selected into the program were preference outliers who wielded their newfound agency differently from their federal counterparts: Rather than using the immigration system to help police felonies, they deployed the criminal justice system to police immigration.
JOP 88/3 pp. 1098-1114 2026-07-01 Original A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data
Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas
Abstract
（原文未提供摘要）
中文 基于唱名表决数据的政党对立法行为影响的一个模型
Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas
PAR — 2026-06-30
Original The Diffusion of Local Administrative Innovation: Investigating Municipal Climate Managers in the State of Hessen in Central Germany
Kai Schulze, Jonas J. Schoenefeld, Marco Nicolay
PMR — pp. 1-25 2026-06-30 Original Interagency collaboration, broker organization, and bureaucratic responsiveness: how public agencies fix complex citizen requests on digital government platforms?
Yao Liu, Wenting Yang