Polihot

PSJ 54/3 2026-08-12 Original Time's Sentimental Tale: Operationalizing Plot Within the Narrative Policy Framework Rachel McGovern, Crystal Soderman, Alex Osei‐Kojo, Michael D. Jones, Kristin L. Olofsson

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2603437123-e2603437123 2026-08-12 Original The relationship between officer misconduct and convictionless arrests Bocar A. Ba, Nayoung Rim, Roman Rivera Abstract This paper examines whether officers with high prior alleged misconduct are more likely to make convictionless arrests (arrests that result in no or dismissed charges or where the defendant is found not guilty). Using the Chicago Police Department's rotational duty calendar to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the set of officers assigned to work on a particular day, we find that high-misconduct officers make statistically significantly more arrests for nonindex crimes and in situations involving high officer discretion, compared to their no-misconduct peers. Our findings also suggest that downstream legal actors, such as prosecutors and judges, may be partially "correcting" these arrests.

PMR — pp. 1-25 2026-08-12 Original Should we stay or should we go? Implications of trust in the municipality for second-generation migrants’ behavioural intentions towards the municipality

PSJ 54/3 2026-08-12 Original A Narrative Walks Into a Forum: Bridging the Narrative Policy and Ecology of Games Frameworks Rachel McGovern, Danielle M. McLaughlin, Jack Mewhirter, Michael D. Jones

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2609567123-e2609567123 2026-08-11 Original US schools’ proximity to environmental hazard sites: A national analysis Sohil Malik, Matthew A. Kraft, Grace Falken

JPART — 2026-08-11 Original Institutional amnesia and public administration: does history repeat? Alastair Stark, Hridesh Gajural, Jack Corbett, Dennis C Grube, Heather Lovell, Rodney J Scott

PMR — pp. 1-29 2026-08-11 Original Citizens’ support for behavioural public policy and trust in government: evidence from two online experiments Paolo Belardinelli, Martin Lodge Abstract We explore citizens’ support for behavioral interventions by distinguishing interventions that exploit citizens’ bounded rationality through choice architecture (Nudge) from those that challenge bounded rationality by promoting reflection through deliberative forums (Think). We also examine the role of trust in government in shaping these preferences. Findings from two experiments involving 3,010 US participants show that citizens are more willing to support Think rather than Nudge. Whereas the adoption of Nudge, as compared to Think, does not seem to influence trust in government, encouraging higher levels of trust in government has a stronger effect on support for Nudge than for Think.

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2515300123-e2515300123 2026-08-10 Original The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences Letizia Paoli, Peter Reuter Abstract Illegal markets, broadly defined to include markets where only specific transactions are illegal, are the consequence of policy, either a prohibition or highly restrictive regulation. They are generated by a variety of concerns, some moral, some pragmatic. They are often tied to legal markets, complicating the policy process. These markets are ubiquitous, rarely well controlled and little studied as markets. This article examines variations in illegality from the case studies in this Special Feature and synthesizes what can be learned about the success and failure of different approaches to controlling these markets. Control is often weak because powerful legal interests are opposed to tight regulation and, especially in markets with large underlying demand, rarely leads to substantial reductions in the targeted activity, unless draconian methods are used. As demonstrated by drug markets, tough enforcement can have large adverse collateral consequences. The paper concludes by suggesting that an extension of the harm reduction framework developed specifically for drug policy can be applied usefully to making policy choices in controlling other illegal markets.

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512080123-e2512080123 2026-08-10 Original The money laundering market: An economic analysis Joras Ferwerda Abstract Criminals launder their proceeds from crime, either themselves or by paying a professional, to disguise the link between the criminal, the crime, and the proceeds. This allows the criminal to spend the proceeds more freely and lowers the chance of receiving unwanted attention from the authorities. This paper investigates the structure and dynamics of the understudied market for money laundering services. The analysis reveals that this illegal market is demand-driven and fragmented, with different forms of laundering, each requiring different steps with varying levels of risk. High search costs, specialized money launderers, and uncertainties lead to local monopolies. Demand tends to be relatively inelastic because criminals eventually need laundering services to spend their proceeds. Local monopolies, inelastic demand, and poor information flows lead to relatively high prices for laundering. Trust issues and two-sided asymmetric information lead to a market with relationships that tend to last longer than generally expected in illegal markets.

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2511019122-e2511019122 2026-08-10 Original The market for human smuggling: Structure, mechanisms, and paradoxes Paolo Campana Abstract Human smuggling is the facilitation of unlawful cross-border movement. It is primarily a commercial activity, offered as a service to willing, paying customers, and a large-scale market catering to millions seeking to circumvent mobility restrictions. Contrary to prevailing media and political narratives that depict smuggling as dominated by powerful and highly sophisticated criminal organizations, this study documents a fragmented, decentralized market composed of independent, localized actors operating through flexible, often temporary networks. These flexible arrangements, coupled with low barriers to entry, confer resilience and adaptability to the market, making enforcement difficult and resource-intensive. Intensified enforcement often produces unintended consequences, including heightened migrant vulnerability and increased reliance on smugglers. Despite regional differences, smuggling operations exhibit striking structural similarities shaped by local knowledge and monitoring costs. Such enduring structural characteristics exist alongside a growing role played by communication technologies, which are reshaping dynamics between service providers and customers. Ultimately, human smuggling remains a market fraught with paradoxes: Migrants face severe risks yet view smugglers as essential facilitators, while states confront the complex task of balancing border enforcement with humanitarian obligations and protections of vulnerable individuals.